The Robotarium: A remotely accessible swarm robotics research testbed by Pickem, Daniel et al.
The Robotarium: A remotely accessible swarm robotics research testbed
Daniel Pickem, Paul Glotfelter, Li Wang, Mark Mote, Aaron Ames, Eric Feron, and Magnus Egerstedt
Abstract— This paper describes the Robotarium – a remotely
accessible, multi-robot research facility. The impetus behind the
Robotarium is that multi-robot testbeds constitute an integral
and essential part of the multi-robot research cycle, yet they are
expensive, complex, and time-consuming to develop, operate,
and maintain. These resource constraints, in turn, limit access
for large groups of researchers and students, which is what the
Robotarium is remedying by providing users with remote access
to a state-of-the-art multi-robot test facility. This paper details
the design and operation of the Robotarium and discusses the
considerations one must take when making complex hardware
remotely accessible. In particular, safety must be built into the
system already at the design phase without overly constraining
what coordinated control programs users can upload and
execute, which calls for minimally invasive safety routines with
provable performance guarantees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coordinated control of multi-robot systems has received
significant attention during the last decades, with a num-
ber of distributed control and decision algorithms being
developed to solve a wide variety of tasks, ranging from
environmental monitoring to collective material handling.
These developments have been driven by a confluence of
algorithmic advances, increased hardware miniaturization,
and cost reduction, and a number of compelling multi-robot
testbeds have been developed (e.g., [1], [2]). However, de-
spite these advances, it is still a complex and time-consuming
proposition to go from theory and simulation, via a small
team of robots, all the way to a robustly deployed, large-
scale multi-robot system. Yet, actual deployment is crucial to
advance multi-robot research since it is increasingly difficult
to faithfully simulate all the issues associated with making
multiple robots perform coordinated tasks. Even more diffi-
cult is the discovery of new issues based on analytical models
of multi-robot systems alone.
The Robotarium, as shown in Figure 1, is an open, remote-
access multi-robot testbed, explicitly designed to address
this theory-simulation-practice gap by providing access to
a testbed that is flexible enough to allow for a number of
different scientific questions to be asked, and different coor-
dination algorithms to be tested. What sets the Robotarium
apart from other testbeds is its explicit focus on support-
ing safe remote-access multi-robot research, as opposed to
testbeds that can be accessed remotely but do not explicitly
consider formal safety measures or have an educational, as
opposed to a research focus. Throughout this work, we will
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Fig. 1. Example of a coverage control algorithm executed on the
Robotarium using 13 GRITSBot robots. The desired density function is
projected onto the testbed arena in the shape of the letter R.
interpret safety as the avoidance of damaging collisions and
quantify it through safety scores that determine whether user
code is allowed to execute without further safety measures
or not. The Robotarium makes hardware remotely accessible
to both trusted and untrustworthy or malicious users while
avoiding damage in a provable way. In this paper, we discuss
how the Robotarium is structured and, in particular, how
the explicit focus on being a flexible and safe remote-access
research platform informs the design.1
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly survey the field of remote access
testbeds that have been successful in their respective domains
and broadly categorize them along the following dimensions:
multi-robot testbeds, sensor network testbeds, and remotely
accessible educational tools. A comprehensive overview can
be found in [4]–[6] and the references therein.
A. Multi-Robot Testbeds
Numerous remotely accessible multi-robot testbeds with a
focus on robot mobility have been proposed over the years -
for example the Mobile Emulab [1], or the HoTDeC testbed
[7]. A comprehensive list of multi-robot testbeds can be
found in [5]. Generally speaking, testbeds in this domain
contain robots that occupy a significantly larger footprint and
are more expensive than the Robotarium robots, which is an
inherent obstruction to using large numbers of robots.2 The
1The report from a recent NSF Workshop on Remotely Accessible
Testbeds [3] identified this inherent safety/flexibility tension as one of the
key questions when pursuing a ”science of remote access”.
2A GRITSBot can be built for approximately $60 or bought pre-
assembled for approximately $100 - see the bill of materials at www.
robotarium.org
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main difference between these testbeds and the Robotarium,
however, is that the Robotarium explicitly addresses the
robot safety aspect of remote accessibility such that provable
damage avoidance of the Robotarium’s physical assets is
guaranteed even with untrustworthy or malicious users. The
testbeds mentioned above in principle allow remote access
for cases where a user can be trusted to not damage the
hardware but do not explicitly address the safety issues
involved once users have been approved for use. Unlike these
testbeds, the Robotarium is inherently safe to operate because
built-in (online and offline) safety measures prevent users
from causing accidental or purposeful damage to the robots.
B. Sensor Networks Testbeds and Cybersecurity
Some of the earliest remote-access testbeds reside in the
sensor networks and cybersecurity domains. Limiting access
to largely immobile computing and sensing nodes mitigated
the risk of making them publicly accessible. This category
includes testbeds such as ORBIT [8], FIT IoT-Lab [9],
DeterLab [10] and CONET [11], with the ORBIT testbed [8]
and the DeterLab [10] standing out for their over a decade
long remote operation. Of these testbeds, the FIT IoT-Lab
[9] and CONET [11] contain mobile sensing nodes which
both require significant resources and spaces to operate. The
FIT IoT-Lab’s over 200 mobile nodes are spread across six
sites in France. Compared to the Robotarium’s focus on
mobility and coordinated control, FIT Iot-Lab’s main focus,
however, lies on communications and networking research in
an IoT context. For a comprehensive overview of networking
testbeds refer to [6] and the references therein.
C. Educational Testbeds
A number of testbeds have originated in the educational
domain. For example, the Robotic Programming Network
(RPN) [2] makes a single humanoid robot remotely acces-
sible while Robotnacka [12] provides access to three mo-
bile robots. A comprehensive overview of other educational
testbeds can be found in [4]. While providing the required in-
frastructure for remote access, compared to the Robotarium,
most educational testbeds contain small numbers of robots
and are not explicitly designed to be research platforms for
multi-robot or swarm robotics experiments.
III. THE ROBOTARIUM
The Robotarium is a swarm-robotic research testbed that
is accessible through a public web interface and gives users
the flexibility to test a variety of multi-robot algorithms
(see examples of remote experiments in Section V-B). In
particular the Robotarium tackles the challenge of robust,
long-term, and safe operation of large groups of robots
with minimal operator intervention and maintenance. The
continuous operation of the Robotarium highlights the need
for automated maintenance, which relies on robust posi-
tion tracking, automated battery recharging, and provably
collision-free execution of motion paths. In this section, we
will outline how these requirements guided the design of
the first Robotarium instantiation, and elaborate on both the
hardware and software architectures of the Robotarium.
A. Design Considerations
As a shared, remotely accessible, multi-robot facility, the
Robotarium’s main purpose is to lower the barrier of entrance
into multi-agent robotics. Therefore, for the Robotarium to
fulfill its intended use effectively, it has to implement a num-
ber of high-level design requirements aimed at accessibility,
ease of maintenance, intuitive interaction, and safe and secure
code execution.
• Enable inexpensive replication of the Robotarium
through low-cost, open-source robots (currently up to
20 robots are available).
• Enable intuitive interaction with and simple data collec-
tion from the Robotarium through a public web interface
that facilitates code submission and data/video retrieval.
• Enable a seamless switch between development in sim-
ulation and execution on the physical robots facilitated
by a data-driven characterization of the simulation-
hardware gap of the robots.
• Minimize the cost and complexity of maintaining a large
collective of robots through convenience features such
as automatic charging and tracking.
• Integrate safety and security measures to protect the
Robotarium from damage and misuse through guaran-
teed collision avoidance.
B. Prototype Design
This section elaborates on the hardware and software
components of the Robotarium as well as their interaction
with each other, the robots, and the users (see Fig. 2).
The Robotarium hardware includes the robots themselves,
the position tracking system, the wireless communication
hardware, as well as a charging system built into surface of
the arena. The software back end consists of the simulation
and virtualization infrastructure (also used for simulation-
based code verification), interaction components (APIs), and
the coordinating server application.
1) Hardware: The Robotarium is meant to provide a well
integrated, immersive user experience with a small footprint
(the current testbed measures 130×90×180 cm), and features
that allow a large swarm to be maintained effortlessly. At
the core of the Robotarium are our custom-designed robots
- the GRITSBots (introduced in [13]). These inexpensive,
miniature differential drive robots simplify operation and
maintenance of the Robotarium through features such as (i)
automated registration with the server and overhead tracking
system, (ii) automatic battery charging, and (iii) wireless
(re)programming. While the initial implementation of these
features has been described in detail in [13], major design
revisions warrant a review and update.3
• Robots: The GRITSBot’s modular design consists of a
main board handling high-level intelligence, connectiv-
ity, power conditioning, and charging as well as a motor
board responsible for the robot’s motion. Compared
3A detailed description of the robot’s hardware design including its
design and code files are open-source and can be downloaded at https:
//github.com/robotarium/GRITSBot_hardware_design.
Fig. 2. System architecture overview. The Robotarium includes components that are executed locally on Robotarium infrastructure as well as user-
facing components that run on remote user machines (web front end). Three components interact directly with the robot hardware – tracking, wireless
communication, and virtualization. The remaining components handle user management, code verification and upload to the server, as well as coordination
of user data and testbed-generated data.
to the initial specifications in [13], the GRITSBot has
undergone multiple design iterations. Specifically, the
robot’s main board has been upgraded with the WiFi-
enabled ESP8266 chip popular in the Internet of Things
community. Operating at 160 MHz, this chip is capable
of handling wireless communication, pose estimation,
low-level control of the robot, as well as high-level be-
haviors. The ESP8266 chip’s WiFi transceiver supports
the IEEE 802.11 B/G/N standards with a bandwidth
of up to 54 MBit/s. Note that the ESP8266 chip also
enables wireless over-the-air code upload to the robots,
which allows the Robotarium back end to upload new
firmware to the robots within seconds. Equipped with a
400 mAh LiPo battery, the robot is capable of operating
up to 40 minutes on a single charge while recharg-
ing takes approximately 45 minutes. The GRITSBot’s
motor board features an Atmega 168 microcontroller,
which controls the stepper motors. Compared to the de-
sign shown in [13], the motor board has been equipped
with additional introspective sensors (specifically motor
current and temperature sensors) to enable predictive
diagnostics of the robot’s hardware state. Note that the
robots are currently not equipped with sensor boards
since distance sensing can be emulated through the back
end server which tracks the positions of all robots.
• Tracking: The global position of all robots is retrieved
through an overhead tracking system and is required
to close the position control feedback loop. The Rob-
otarium uses a single webcam in conjunction with
ArUco tags for tracking.4 Note that most decentralized
algorithms do not rely on global position updates but
rather sensor data. However, system maintenance such
as recharging robots automatically or setting up an
4ArUco is an OpenCV-based library for Augmented Reality applications.
experiment relies on global position data.
• Charging: A crucial component of a self-sustaining
testbed is an automatic recharging mechanism for its
robots. The GRITSBot has been equipped with a wire-
less charging system for autonomous charging through
a receiver coil attached to the robot (see Fig. 3b) and
transmitters built into the Robotarium arena surface
(both devices rely on the Qi wireless charging standard).
Automatic recharging of robots is an essential aspect
that will enable the long-term use of robots and the
automated management of the Robotarium hardware
with minimal operator intervention (see Section V-A)
and at the same time make the continuous operation of
the Robotarium economically feasible.
2) Software: The software components managing the
operation of the Robotarium can be broadly grouped into
three categories: simulation-based components, components
enabling the interaction with the testbed, and coordinating
server applications (see Fig. 2).
• Simulation: The simulation capabilities of the Robotar-
ium are leveraged in three distinct ways: prototyping
of user code, verification of user-provided code, and
adding virtual robots. The simulators enable users to
prototype and test their algorithms on their own ma-
chines before submitting them for execution on the Rob-
otarium.5 Once submitted, but before being executed on
the testbed, the same simulation infrastructure verifies
collision-free execution of user code (see Section IV-A).
Additionally, the simulator also allows adding virtual
robots to the testbed arena that are capable of interacting
with the physical robots through the server back end.
5The simulators are currently implemented in Matlab and Python and
available in the ’Downloads’ section at http://robotarium.org/
• Interaction: These components govern how users can
interact with the Robotarium. Two principal methods
of interaction are enabled by the components shown in
Fig. 2: local access through provided APIs as well as
remote interaction through web-based code upload.6 Lo-
cal access requires users to connect to the Robotarium’s
WiFi network and is primarily used for development
purposes. Remote access, on the other hand, requires
users to implement and test algorithms in simulation
before submitting them to the Robotarium via its web
interface at www.robotarium.org. Submitted code
undergoes simulation-based verification that checks for
error- and collision-free execution before code is exe-
cuted on physical robots (see Section IV-A).7
• Coordination: The server application is the central co-
ordinating instance responsible for executing user code,
routing commands and data to and from robots, trans-
mitting global position data to the robots, and managing
simulated virtual robots. In addition the server logs all
generated data and makes them available to users. Note
that the robots execute a velocity controller onboard.
However, the user’s control code is executed on the
server and essentially remote controls the robots by
providing velocity control inputs to the robots. This
centralized execution increases overall robustness of
the Robotarium, simplifies data logging as well as
establishing formal safety guarantees, and facilitates
automatic maintenance.8 Note that centralization can
lead to communication and computation bottlenecks.
Given the total bandwidth of 802.11g WiFi of 54 MBit/s
and typical bandwidth requirements of 3 KBytes/s/robot
the theoretical upper limit is 18,000 robots. Clearly,
WiFi collisions, buffering issues, interference, and other
issues will practically lower that number. However,
operating hundreds of robots simultaneously is well
within the limits of the Robotarium’s WiFi-based com-
munication architecture. Computational scalability is
addressed in Section IV-B.
IV. SAFETY
Allowing remote users to control the Robotarium’s physi-
cal equipment poses inherent risks to the integrity and safety
of the hardware. To avoid damaging the hardware, a com-
bination of offline simulation-based verification and online
collision avoidance using barrier certificates is employed. By
default, the execution of all user-supplied control code will
be safe-guarded using barrier functions (see Section IV-B).
However, users can bypass this online safety mechanism if
6Note that no real-time teleoperation of robots is enabled for security
reasons. Submitted user-code is executed locally on the Robotarium server
and as such latency is negligible.
7Remote access to the Robotarium requires manual screening of ap-
plicants. Interested users can apply for access privileges via the website
www.robotarium.org.
8Note, however, that other decentralized communication architectures
such as peer-to-peer communication are also enabled by the WiFi-based
communication architecture.
(a) 3D rendering of the GRITSBot (b) A GRITSBot wirelessly charging
on a base station of the Robotarium.
Fig. 3. 3D model and current hardware implementation of the GRITSBot.
they achieve a sufficiently high safety score during the offline
simulation-based verification step (see Section IV-A).
A. Simulation-based Verification
In this section we introduce an offline method to charac-
terize the safety of a particular experiment and its suitability
for deployment on the Robotarium. A safety score measures
the frequency and severity of collisions in simulation to
predict the collision behavior of an experiment once executed
on hardware. This method relies on stochastic Monte Carlo
simulations to compute the expected values of damage and
safety over multiple simulation runs (currently 50). Uncer-
tainties in the robots’ dynamics model, their initial positions,
as well as the observation model of the overhead camera are
accounted for through added Gaussian noise. Note that strict
collision-free execution is not enforced but minor collisions
below certain damage thresholds are allowed. A sufficiently
high safety score of an experiment allows execution on
the Robotarium without additional online safety mechanisms
(see Section IV-B).
To formalize safety scores, let the index set of N robots be
M = {1, 2, ..., N}. Then the function D ∈ R+ computes the
cumulative damage done to N robots over a time horizon
T and is defined as follows.
D =
∑
i∈M
Di ,
∑
i∈M
∫ T
0
Ii(t)δi(t)dt,
Here, δi(t) captures the rate at which robot i’s kinetic energy
is lost through a collision at time t and Ii(t) is an indicator
function that is 0 if robot i is not colliding with any other
object at time t and 1 otherwise. In discrete time Di can be
approximated using the work-energy principle as follows.
Di ≈
T/∆t−1∑
k=0
Ii(k∆t)
m
2
[
v2(k∆t)− v2((k + 1)∆t)] , (1)
where m = 60g is the mass of the robot, ~v is its velocity
vector such that v2 = ~v · ~v, and ∆t = 1/30s is the time
step of the system governed by the tracking camera update
rate. Note that Eqn. (1) assumes that a reduction in robot
i’s velocity is proportional to a loss in kinetic energy and
therefore approximates damage.9 The cumulative safety score
S is then defined as,
S , 1− D
Dmax
,
where Dmax is the maximum allowable damage threshold
for the entire experiment. Note that S is a unit-less value
S ∈ (−∞, 1] which captures the energy lost from collisions
over the time span of the experiment. In a similar fashion,
we can limit the allowable damage done to any one robot
i in the swarm by defining an individual safety score si ,
1 − Didi,max ∈ (−∞, 1] with respect to a separate threshold
di,max ∈ R+. Experiments are allowed to proceed for
unmodified deployment in the Robotarium when both the
cumulative and individual safety scores are positive.
B. Safety Barrier Certificates
The Robotarium uses Safety Barrier Certificates to guar-
antee provably collision-free behavior of all robots, which
ensures the following three principles.
• All robots are provably safe in the sense that collisions
are avoided.
• Users’ commands are only modified when collisions are
imminent.
• Collision avoidance is executed in real-time (in excess
of 30 Hz update rate).
Safety barrier certificates are enforced through the use of
control barrier functions, which are Lyapunov-like functions
that can provably guarantee forward set invariance, i.e. if
the system starts in the safe set, it stays in the safe set for
all time. A specific class of maximally permissive control
barrier functions was introduced in [14], whose construction
provides the basis for the minimally invasive safety guaran-
tees afforded by the Robotarium.
Consider a team of N mobile robots with the index set
M = {1, 2, ..., N}. Each robot i uses single integrator
dynamics of the form x˙i = ui, where xi ∈ R2 is the planar
position of robot i, and ui ∈ R2 is its input velocity.10 Addi-
tionally, robot i’s velocity ui is bounded by ‖ui‖ ≤ α,∀i ∈
M. Let x = [xT1 , xT2 , ..., xTN ]T and u = [uT1 , uT2 , ..., uTN ]T
denote the aggregate state and velocity input of the entire
team of robots. To avoid inter-robot collisions, any two
robots i and j need to maintain a minimum safety distance
Ds between each other. This requirement is encoded into a
pairwise safe set Cij , ∀ i 6= j, which is a super level set of
a smooth function hij(x),
Cij = {xi ∈ R2 | hij(x) = ‖xi − xj‖2 −D2s ≥ 0}. (2)
9The maximum energy loss possible from an inelastic collision involving
a single GRITSBot weighing at most 60g directed towards a wall at its
maximum speed of 0.1 m/s is 9.9 µJ .
10Single integrator dynamics can be easily mapped to the GRITSBot’s
unicycle dynamics using a nonlinear inversion method. It is also important
to note that safety barrier certificates can be extended to more complex
dynamical systems as well.
The function hij(x) is called a control barrier function, if
the admissible control space
Kij(x) =
{
u ∈ R2N
∣∣∣∣ ∂hij(x)∂x u ≥ −γhij(x)
}
, (3)
is non-empty for all xi ∈ Cij . It was shown in [15] that if
the control input u stays in Kij(x) for all time, then the
safe set Cij is forward invariant. In addition, the forward
invariance property of Cij is robust with respect to different
perturbations on the system.
Combining (2) and (3) as well as the single integrator
dynamics, the velocity input u needs to satisfy
−2(xi − xj)ui + 2(xi − xj)uj ≤ γhij(x), ∀ i 6= j.
This inequality can be treated as a linear constraint on u
when the state x is given, i.e., Aiju ≤ bij , ∀ i 6= j, where
Aij = [0, . . . ,−2(xi − xj)T︸ ︷︷ ︸
robot i
, . . . , 2(xi − xj)T︸ ︷︷ ︸
robot j
, . . . , 0]
bij = γhij(x).
Similar constraints must be established for the workspace
boundary. The corresponding safety set of robot i with re-
gards to the boundary is denoted by C¯i, and the corresponding
constraints by A¯iui ≤ b¯i, ∀ i ∈M.
Combining these constraints – all pairwise collisions and
collisions with the workspace boundaries – results in the
safety set for the entire team as
C =
∏
i∈M
{ ⋂
j∈M
j 6=i
Cij
⋂
C¯i
}
.
The forward invariance of the safe set C is guaranteed by the
safety barrier certificates, which are defined as
K(x) =
{
u ∈ R2N ∣∣ Aiju ≤ bij , A¯iui ≤ b¯i, ∀ i 6= j} .
(4)
These safety barrier certificates define a convex polytope
K(x) in which safe control commands must stay. By
constraining users’ control commands to within K(x), the
Robotarium is guaranteed to operate in a provably collision-
free manner.
The minimally invasive nature of barrier certificate-enabled
collision avoidance stems from the fact that the deviation
between the user-specified control signal and the actual, safe,
executed signal is minimized, subject to the safety constraints
through a Quadratic Program (QP)-based controller
u∗ = argmin
u∈R2n
J(u) =
N∑
i=1
‖ui − uˆi‖2
s.t. Aiju ≤ bij , ∀ i 6= j,
A¯iui ≤ b¯i, ∀ i ∈M,
‖ui‖∞ ≤ α, ∀ i ∈M,
where uˆ is the user’s control command, u∗ is the actual
control command, and α is the bound for the control input.
Note that in the absence of impending collisions (i.e. when
the safety barrier certificates in (4) are satisfied), the user’s
(a) Time 2.67s (b) Time 9.50s (c) Time 19.83s
Fig. 4. Ten GRITSBots swap positions with active safety barrier certificates. The robots’ trajectories are shown together with square markers representing
their initial positions.
code is executed faithfully. When violations occur, a closest
possible (in a least-squares sense) safe control command
is computed and executed instead. An experiment showing
ten GRITSBots swapping positions with active safety barrier
certificates is shown in Fig. 4, while the corresponding video
is referenced in Table II.
Scalability of Safety Barrier Certificates: Safety barrier
certificates are computed in a centralized fashion on the
Robotarium’s back end server and therefore scalability is a
concern. As the size of the swarm increases, the number of
decision variables (u) in the QP-based controller increases
linearly, while the number of pairwise safety constraints
grows quadratically. However, a more computationally effi-
cient implementation similar to [16] is possible, where agent
i only considers its neighbors for collision avoidance and
the certificates computation can be distributed to individual
agents. More specifically, the robot’s finite physical dimen-
sions limit the maximum robot density. For example, for a
minimum safety distance of Ds = 8cm and a neighborhood
radius of 20cm, any given neighborhood can contain at most
26 other robots, which limits the size of each individual
robots QP problem to 2 decision variables and at most 26
linear constraints. The computation time of safety barrier
certificates for centralized as well as decentralized computa-
tion is shown in Table I. Note that the decentralized barrier
certificates were computed on a single central computer.11
Thus, the total computation time Td is divided by N to
characterize the decentralized and fully parallel implementa-
tion. As Table I shows, while centralized computation suffers
from scaling up the number of robots, the computation time
of decentralized safety barrier certificates remains below
10ms even for 100 robots. In fact, decentralized safety
barrier certificates can handle 100 GRITSBots with an update
frequency of 185Hz and therefore scale to large numbers of
robots without compromising update rates.
V. USAGE
This section highlights the main usage features of the Rob-
otarium: continuous operation and auto-recharging of robots,
safe remote access for external users, and the characterization
11Barrier certificates were computed on an Intel I7 4790 3.6 GHz with
16 GB of memory.
and closing of the simulation-hardware gap that can prevent
the successful execution of controls code on physical robots.
The following sections detail each of these features.
A. Long-term Operation
The robust long-term operation of the Robotarium is
predicated on a reliable and autonomous charging mech-
anism for its robots. In this section we therefore provide
experimental evidence of the reliability of the GRITSBot’s
wireless charging mechanism (see Section III-B.1) and the
Robotarium’s capabilities for continuous operation.
This section summarizes the results of three experiments,
each of which made use of three robots and continuously
executed an example algorithm over the course of 140,
148, and 240 minutes, respectively. During these times, each
robot executed 37, 39, and 60 autonomous recharge cycles,
i.e. successfully charged its battery through the wireless
chargers.12 Out of a total of 111, 117, and 180 autonomous
charge cycles, manual intervention was only required twice
in the first experiment and once in the second, because a
robots onboard control software froze. The success rate of the
autonomous charging system was therefore 98.1%, 99.1%,
and 100%, respectively. A time-lapse video showing the
continuous operation of three robots is referenced in Table
II.
B. External Users
This section presents a selection of external user experi-
ments that have been developed using a Robotarium-provided
simulator and executed on the Robotarium using the software
infrastructure shown in Section III-B.2 and Fig. 2. These
examples were chosen as representative samples since they
highlight the breadth of algorithms that can be executed on
the Robotarium but also validate its remote access aspect.
Note that the corresponding videos are referenced in Table
II.
12Note that we shortened each charge cycle in the interest of time and
therefore on average a charge cycle only lasted approximately 6 minutes - 3
minutes of experiment and 3 minutes of charging. As mentioned in Section
III-B.1 the GRITSBot’s runtime on a single charge is up to 40 minutes.
(a) Distributed formation control of six GRITS-
Bots assembling a regular hexagon starting at
random initial positions.
(b) Fault-tolerant consensus with five collab-
orating robots (shown in blue) and one mali-
cious robot (shown in red). The collaborative
agents achieve rendezvous despite the mali-
cious robot’s efforts to prevent it.
(c) Passivity-based attitude synchronization im-
plemented on a team of nine GRITSBots.
Fig. 5. Experimental data from external user experiments rendered onto images of the Robotarium testbed setup. The square markers and curves are
initial positions and trajectories of the GRITSBots, respectively.
Swarm
Size N
Centralized Cer-
tificates Tc (ms)
Decentralized Cer-
tificates Td/N (ms)
10 5.6 3.2
40 11.6 3.5
100 78.0 5.4
TABLE I
COMPUTATION TIME OF BARRIER CERTIFICATES PER ITERATION.
1) Distributed Formation Control of Cyclic Formations
from the University of Texas, Dallas: This experiment instan-
tiated a distributed formation control algorithm for regular
polygonal formations, originally presented in [17], [18]. The
controller uses relative position measurements in local coor-
dinate frames and prohibits any inter-agent communication.
Note that [18] assumes agents to be points in the plane
and does not consider collision avoidance. The successful
execution on the Robotarium therefore depended on the use
of Robotarium-provided barrier certificates shown in Section
IV-B and a mapping from single-integrator dynamics to the
unicycle dynamics of the robots. Figure 5a shows the results
of this experiment with six robots.
2) Fault-tolerant Rendezvous from the University of Illi-
nois Urbana-Champaign: A second experiment instanti-
ated a fault-tolerant version of the rendezvous algorithm,
originally presented in [19]. In this work, agents achieve
consensus by moving towards points within a safe set, while
maintaining connectivity through extendable sensing capa-
bilities [19]. Because this algorithm models agents as points
in the plane and contains no native collision avoidance, the
successful execution utilize the single-integrator-to-unicycle
mapping and barrier certificates provided by the Robotarium.
Figure 5b shows the results of this experiment with six
robots.
3) Passivity-based Attitude Synchronization from the
Tokyo Institute of Technology: A passivity-based attitude
synchronization algorithm, originally presented in [20], was
implemented on the Robotarium. Utilizing the passivity prop-
erty of general rigid-body motion in SE(3), this algorithm
was designed to achieve attitude synchronization for a group
of rigid bodies with only local information exchanges, i.e.,
vi = vj , limt→∞ θi(t)− θj(t) = 0,∀i 6= j. The successfully
execution of this algorithm relied on the following capabili-
ties provided by the Robotarium: 1) specification of a local
information exchange graph, i.e., a cycle graph (CN ); 2) a
mapping from single-integrator to unicyle dynamics. Figure
5c shows the results of this experiment with eight robots.
C. The Simulation-Hardware Gap
The Robotarium’s infrastructure (see Section III-B) is set
up such that users prototype their code using the provided
simulators and submit the exact same code for execution on
the Robotarium’s hardware. As such, it is important that the
simulators provide a reasonably accurate approximation of
the robots behavior. To characterize this simulation-hardware
gap, we use linear regression on recorded data to provide a
measure of system identification. This characterization relies
on the GRITSBots dynamical model, i.e. the unicycle model
given by
x˙ =
x˙1x˙2
x˙3
 =
cos(θ) 0sin(θ) 0
0 1
[v
ω
]
, (5)
where θ is the orientation of the robot, v and ω are its
linear and angular velocity, respectively. We assume that
each linear regression coefficient appears in the observation
model as ˆ˙xi = αix˙i, where ˆ˙xi is an observation of x˙i that
is obtained through the Euler method applied to observed
position and orientation values. Let ˆ˙Xi ∈ Rd, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
be the collection of observations ˆ˙xi and X˙i ∈ Rd be the
collection of evaluations of the unicycle model x˙i, where
d is the number of data points (here, we use d = 30000
data points). Then each coefficient is determined by the least
squares linear regression equation
αi = (X˙
T
i X˙i)
−1X˙Ti
ˆ˙Xi,
which yields the following modified unicycle model given
by
˙¯x = diag(α1, α2, α3)x˙,
Algorithm Link to Video
Safety barriers https://youtu.be/PWJk-oMcgn4
Long-term Operation https://youtu.be/PBdrD7ZS-qM
Track-following https://youtu.be/VIirTkWppkE
Dist. Formation Control https://youtu.be/DXcF0h8Vld0
Fault-tolerant Consensus https://youtu.be/AlUyUVoVMu0
Attitude Synchronization https://youtu.be/cItg_vGv3jo
TABLE II
LIST OF VIDEO REFERENCES.
where α1 = 0.8645, α2 = 0.8119, α3 = 0.4640. The
used data displayed a linear relationship between ˆ˙x and x˙,
ensuring the accuracy of the linear regression. The Rob-
otarium simulators use these values for αi together with
Eqn. (5) to simulate the robot’s dynamics. To evaluate the
accuracy of the linear regression results, we furthermore
implemented a waypoint-following algorithm (see [21]). A
video of this experiment is referenced in Table II while the
following provides a numeric estimate of the error between
simulation and hardware execution. In particular, let xsim(t)
be the trajectory in simulation and x(t) the trajectory of the
GRITSBot. Then we calculate the average error between the
simulated and experimental trajectories as
E(xsim(t), x(t)) =
1
T
∫ T
0
min
τ∈[0,T ]
(‖xsim(τ)− x(t)‖) dt,
which for this experiment yielded an error value of
E(xsim(t), x(t)) = 0.0052 m,
or an average difference of 5 mm between simulation and
hardware execution.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have detailed the development of a
remotely accessible, multi-robot research facility – the Robo-
tarium. Beyond introducing the hardware and software com-
ponents required to enable remote access of robot swarms,
the Robotarium addressed the two key concerns of flexibility
and safety. Unlike other remotely accessible testbeds, the
Robotarium makes use of formal methods to ensure the
safety of its physical assets and the avoidance of damage
to the robots. These methods guarantee collision avoidance
in a minimally invasive manner without overly constraining
the type of control algorithms that can be executed on the
Robotarium. To demonstrate the flexibility and versatility
of this testbed as well as its use by the community, we
have shown a number of external user examples that were
deployed on the Robotarium with little implementation over-
head and provable collision avoidance.
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